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Comparing reform of agricultural policy in Bangladesh, Chile, China and New Zealand, this paper derives lessons for countries contemplating 
reform. In all cases reforms to farm policy were under-
taken as part of overall reforms across the whole economy, 
started in response to a perceived national crisis and 
usually implemented by new governments with aman-
date to make major changes. Political will is, not surpris-
ingly, a necessary condition.  
 In designing reforms and their implementation, much 
depends on context, including external conditions such 
as world market prices. The scope for change, and 
certainly the sequence and pace of reform, may be as 
much a matter of administrative feasibility as choice. 
Where outcomes are uncertain and state capacity limited, 
gradual approaches to reform that allow for learning may 
be better than swift and comprehensive ‘big bang’ 
packages.
This working paper presents the first stage of a review 
of agricultural reform experiences within African coun-
tries, specifically Ethiopia, Kenya and Malawi. It aims to 
draw out issues for would-be reformers by examining 
the experience of four cases of agricultural reform, 
purposely selected as often being seen as successful. 
These are: 
Reform of agricultural input markets in Bangladesh in  •
the early 1980s, followed by liberalisation of grain 
trading and the cancellation of several longstanding 
programmes of public distribution of grains during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s; 
The impact of economy-wide reforms and counter- •
reform of land on Chilean agriculture from 1973 
through to the 1980s; 
Introduction of the ‘household responsibility system’  •
of production and liberalisation of marketing in China 
starting around 1978;  and, 
Removal of price and other support to New Zealand  •
farming that began in 1984 and continued into the 
1990s. 
This review seeks to answer the following 
questions:  
What were the conditions that created the impetus  •
for agricultural reform? 
What factors determined the actual content of the  •
reform packages? 
What challenges were faced in the implementation of  •
the reform and what lessons, if any, can be learnt from 
these for future reform programmes?  
What opposition was there to the reforms and how  •
was this overcome? 
What factors exerted the greatest influence on the  •
outcomes of the reform?  
The country cases 
Bangladesh undertook two waves of agricultural reforms 
between the late 1970s and early 1990s. In the first, the 
markets for agricultural inputs above all fertiliser and 
irrigation equipment were liberalised. This led to falling 
prices, greater availability, and increased use of these 
inputs. 
Tubewells and pumps, in particular, allowed a major 
expansion of winter (‘boro’) rice production that saw 
increases in domestic supply of rice outstrip population 
growth and thereby drove down the price of rice. This 
in turn made it easier to implement the second round 
of reforms where the markets for food grains were libera-
lised and some large-scale programmes of food subsidies 
were ended.   
Bangladesh benefited from phased implementation 
of reforms that allowed for learning, monitoring and 
adjustment to developments in the markets. Timing was 
important and fortuitous, since the liberalisation of inputs 
took place just as international prices dropped, thereby 
more than offsetting the loss of subsidies on inputs.   
Much of the impetus for reform came from domestic 
concerns over the costs and ineffectiveness of controls 
on markets and subsidies. Donors were also concerned, 
provided some help for research on the costs, and also 
ended up acting as a target to draw the fire of domestic 
opponents of reform.   
Formal research played a role in revealing the high 
costs of existing policies. The numbers were fed into 
debate by cabinet briefings, policy seminars and by 
(leaked) press reports. People were aware that there were 
problems, but it seems the numbers shocked them suffi-
ciently to act.  
Chile’s reforms took place within the context of 
sweeping changes to overall economic policy carried 
out after the coup of 1973. The first phase that lasted 
until 1975 consisted of gradual measures to liberalise 
the economy and open the country for trade, while 
cutting back on the role of the state. For agriculture, the 
main measure was the part reversal of the redistributive 
land reforms that had taken place in the decade or so 
before the coup, as some large farms were returned to 
their former owners. From 1975, economic policy became 
more radical in a determined attempt to create condi-
tions for business to invest. But after a banking collapse 
in 1982, more pragmatic policies were introduced that 
allowed some trade protection, some regulation of 
finance markets, and some programmes and projects 
that saw the government trying actively to stimulate 
investment and productivity.   
Farming was affected by changes in land ownership, 
the more open trading regime, and by a reduction in the 
provision of public services. By the early 1980s the sector 
had adjusted to reforms  and began to take the oppor-
tunity to boost exports of fruit, forest products, fisheries, 
and wine. The freer market had allowed some concentra-
tion in supply chains with large conglomerates then 
bringing in capital and know-how. From the mid- 1980s 
to the mid-1990s the farm sector grew at annual rates 
that were usually 5% a year or more.  Reformers in Chile 
were able to take advantage of an authoritarian regime 
that was determined to reform the economy to push 
through changes that favoured business, albeit at the 
expense of workers and small farmers. But the path taken 
by Chile was far from being a blueprint: reform went 
through stages, as lessons, sometimes quite painful, were 
learned. The precise configuration of policies was worked 
out through interactions between technocratic econo-
mists- he ‘Chicago boys’ - and elite groups within industry 
and farming, mediated by a leadership that was prepared 
to take unpopular decisions if convinced by the 
arguments.   
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In the case of China, the reforms introduced after 1978 
marked a significant departure from previous economic 
policies. In agriculture, markets for produce that previ-
ously had been under tight control of the state were 
partly liberalised. Land that formerly had been worked 
by production units was leased out to households who 
a few years later were even allowed to rent out their plots. 
Labour markets were eventually allowed.   
The results have been striking: per capita agricultural 
output more than doubled in the two decades following 
reforms, and rural incomes have risen considerably 
making a big dent in poverty. Not all of the increases in 
income can be attributed to agriculture: jobs in 
burgeoning rural industries and remittances from the 
increasing numbers of migrants from rural areas have 
contributed. But some of those changes have been linked 
to reforms in agriculture.  
Although at first sight China made dramatic reforms, 
the process was more gradual, based on experimentation 
and pragmatic choices. The  reformers of the late 1970s 
could draw on the results of tolerated trials in small areas 
carried out in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, once the 
initial round of reforms of 1978–1979 brought gains that 
exceeded expectations, policy-makers were thus encour-
aged to introduce further rounds of reforms from 1984 
onwards that deepened and strengthened the initial 
changes.    
For much of the twentieth century, New Zealand 
farming suffered negative net protection within an 
economy pursuing import-substituting industrialisation. 
However, for a brief period from 1980–84 it enjoyed 
considerably increased support levels that were quickly 
identified by economists and policy makers as unsustain-
able. A Labour government came to power in 1984 
following a snap general election and was quickly forced 
into devaluation of the New Zealand dollar by a financial 
crisis. Despite not having signalled this in its election 
campaign, it then embarked on a radical reform of the 
entire economy, focusing on achieving macroeconomic 
balance and stripping away sectoral policy support.   
Agricultural support - the majority of which was to 
sheep meat, wool and beef production - was the first to 
be cut. In the first year, 1984–85, the effects of the cuts 
were offset by the benefits from exchange rate devalu-
ation combined with high international commodity 
prices. It took longer to control inflation than had been 
expected. In the meantime, high real interest rates caused 
the exchange rate to appreciate again and this, combined 
with two years of lower international commodity prices, 
made the adjustment for New Zealand’s farmers to their 
loss of policy support much more painful than would 
otherwise have been the case. Land prices fell when 
support was withdrawn, leaving some farmers severely 
indebted, whilst farmers in marginal areas found it hard 
to compete in the undistorted market. Some support to 
ease the adjustment process was forthcoming from the 
Labour government after it was returned to power in 
1987.  
 Government agencies in all sectors were subject to 
‘new public management’ aimed at increasing  their 
efficiency. Within the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
reform began in 1985, with initial targets set for cost 
recovery of services such as quality control and extension. 
Organisationally, services were separated from policy 
and ultimately the former were either privatised or spun 
off into independent agencies. An interesting exception 
to radical reform was the preservation of export marketing 
organisations. Instead of introducing competition, efforts 
were made to increase their efficiency and accountability 
to producers.   
Inflation was eventually brought under control in 1989 
and both the economy as a whole and the agricultural 
sector in particular resumed growth in the early 1990s. 
There was some switching out of sheep meat and wool 
towards, in particular, dairy and horticulture. Overall, 
farmers managed to raise total factor productivity, so as 
to maintain overall output levels with reduced inputs, 
there by fairly quickly restoring profit levels after an initial 
shock.  
New Zealand’s reforms were not opposed by the main 
farmers’ organisation. This broadly supported reform and 
indeed, pressed the government to reform other sectors 
such as ports and transport where inefficiencies impaired 
the competitiveness of export agriculture.  
Conclusions 
 The context of agricultural reform was that of response 
to a perceived crisis, either economic, political or a combi-
nation of both. In all cases, with the part exception of 
China, reforms were undertaken following a change of 
government. The crisis seen was not specifically agricul-
tural, nor even rural: in all four cases, it was a national 
problem. It was not surprising then to see that agricultural 
reform was part of a wider set of measures designed to 
affect the entire economy. In all four cases studied here, 
the national programme included liberalisation of 
markets and a retreat of the state from intervening in 
the economy, although we do not mean to imply that 
this is the only form that reform can take.   
The main difference within the four cases was the pace 
and sequencing of the reforms. Chile and New Zealand 
went for swift and comprehensive reforms - ‘big-bangs’, 
while the approach in Bangladesh and China was more 
gradual, with reforms introduced in stages. When exam-
ining the agricultural content of the reforms, in many 
cases these were the sectoral concomitants of a more 
general strategy, as seen for example in the liberalisation 
of markets for agricultural produce and inputs, in reducing 
subsidies, and in reducing the extent of state intervention 
in production and markets. In all cases, the reforms saw 
the scope of public agencies, and especially parastatals, 
reduced.   
Process: the sense of crisis gave incoming govern-
ments a mandate to make substantial changes. In all 
cases, the new leaders of the countries had a vision of 
change and were prepared to bring this about. It helped 
that in three of the cases, the reforming governments 
were not subject to full democratic scrutiny: two military 
administrations in power after coups, and a single-party 
state. In New Zealand, where this condition did not apply, 
it seemed the elected government benefited from a 
widespread acknowledgment that change was 
needed.  
Since both crisis and response were national, rather 
than specifically agricultural, the politics of agricultural 
reform were subsumed within national debates on 
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overall economic strategy. Indeed, in three of the cases, 
important reforms were seemingly imposed on agricul-
ture and the state agencies concerned with the sector 
by policy-makers and advisors situated in more powerful 
parts of the government, notably the ministry of 
finance.   
None of the reforms necessarily went smoothly: all 
were marked by adjustments and indeed, some impor-
tant deviations from the initial schemes were seen. Given 
the more comprehensive nature of reforms in Chile and 
New Zealand than in China and Bangladesh, it is perhaps 
not surprising to find that there were also some ‘fits and 
starts’ in implementation in both these countries.   
Outcomes: Success did not depend on the degree of 
reform. In Bangladesh and China, the modest initial 
measures taken paid off within a year or two. In both 
cases, food production for the domestic market increased 
well ahead of population growth: a valuable gain for 
countries that were very poor at the time and where the 
availability and price of food was a key issue. Initial 
success strengthened the hands of reformers and allowed 
bolder subsequent changes.   
Success came quickly in Bangladesh and China since 
the changes were designed to stimulate farmers to 
increase production of crops and livestock that they knew 
well, for domestic markets that they knew equally well. 
Farmers had to make few adjustments. The main chal-
lenge in these cases was to encourage the emergence 
of private entrepreneurs in the supply chains: input 
dealers, credit intermediaries traders and processors.  
In Chile and New Zealand, on the other hand, the 
response of farming to the changes was delayed, by a 
dozen years in the first case and by half that time in the 
latter. Two reasons relevant to both cases may explain 
the lag in response. First, some of the measures under-
taken to stabilise the macro-economy - higher interest 
rates, less public spending - had deflationary effects that 
affected farming as it did other sectors.   
Second, many farms eventually changed their produc-
tion mix and techniques. In Chile the shift was from 
producing staple foods for the domestic  market towards 
fruit, wine, nuts and other high-value crops for export. 
Exporting was clearly a challenge requiring learning 
about distant markets, achieving standards, and investing 
in the necessary equipment for processing and packing 
- a process that was assisted by the entry of foreign 
capital. In New Zealand farmers knew all about exporting, 
but they also shifted their production mix, away from 
sheep and beef cattle towards horticulture. New Zealand 
farmers also found that they could cut their costs of 
production to their advantage, costs savings outweighing 
any loss of production.  
 
Lessons for Africa and other would-be 
reformers:  
Clearly, reform does not take place without political will. 
These cases support the hypothesis that significant 
changes only emerge from crises. But crisis is not the 
only requirement -if it were, Africa would lead the world 
in reforms. There has also to be a political response to 
crisis, usually a change of administration that has a 
mandate to act. This too is not sufficient: there has to be 
a reasonably coherent vision of strategic change amongst 
leaders and their policy advisers plus a sense that change 
is imperative.   
External conditions usually matter as well: they can 
help or hinder reforms. Few countries can choose the 
moments when external conditions are suitable for 
reform: windows of opportunity for domestic policy 
reform may have to be seized irrespective of international 
market conditions. In most cases it is a question of 
designing measures in the light of external conditions 
- and hoping that they are advantageous.   
Should reform packages be comprehensive and swift 
- the ‘big bang’, or gradual and phased? Big bang has the 
advantages of changing while there is the political will, 
often taking opponents by surprise and giving them little 
chance to obstruct change. If, however, producers are 
to respond quickly to new incentives and opportunities 
it does require functioning markets and indeed a set of 
economic institutions in place. It also requires capacity 
and competence within the public service. Both of these 
conditions existed within the developed New Zealand 
economy, whilst the large farm focus of policy in Chile 
reduced the market access and service delivery 
constraints. However, such conditions rarely exist in 
Africa.   
Gradual approaches, on the other hand, run the risks 
of being waylaid, and may delay unnecessarily the adop-
tion of key reforms. But they have the advantages that 
they allow for some learning; they may be administra-
tively feasible when the civil service has limited capacity; 
and if initial measures are successful, they may whet the 
appetite of leaders and the public for further reforms.   
The choice may be more apparent than real. Some 
reforms are relatively simple and swift to carry out, 
requiring little more than high level policy advice and a 
ministerial decision -think, for example, of altering a tariff, 
changing central bank interest rates, or even adjusting 
government budgets. Others inherently require more 
time and more staff: as applies when restructuring a 
ministry, privatising a state-owned enterprise, or redis-
tributing land. By and large, most measures for macro-
economic stabilisation belong to the first category; 
structural changes, institution building, and many other 
measures that enhance supply response belong to the 
second.   
Not only so different aspects of reform vary, but their 
feasibility will also vary by context - depending on factors 
such as the capacity of the public service, the extent of 
development of markets, institutions and private enter-
prises, and the experience and abilities of farmers. Hence 
the feasibility, pace and sequencing of reform require 
considerable adaptation to circumstances. There may 
thus be less room to choose the pace and sequence of 
reform than may be imagined.   
Since political choices do not have to be rational, and 
rarely are fully informed, it is perfectly possible to 
misjudge the feasible range, pace and sequence of 
reforms. Given such uncertainties, there is something to 
be said for a prior preference for gradual reform, since 
this avoids large mistakes and allows more time for 
learning and adjustment. It may be just coincidence, but 
the two countries that took a more gradual approach to 
reform took no longer to see through the various stages 
of policy changes and see the benefits, than it took the 
two countries that opted for more rapid reforms to see 
the benefits of their changes.
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